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BRIEF OF CORPORATE LAW PROFESSORS
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF NEITHER PARTY
The undersigned corporate law professors respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in support of
neither party.1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of
this case; their interest is in assisting the parties and
the Court in understanding corporate law and the
rights of shareholders, insofar as that law and those
rights are relevant to the questions presented in this
case. Joining in this brief as amici are the following
twenty-two law professors, whose research and teaching have focused on corporate law:
John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of
Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, and Visiting Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School
Michal Barzuza, Nicholas E. Chimicles Research
Professor of Business Law and Regulation, University
of Virginia Law School
Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics,

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amici
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of the brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.3(a),
all appropriate parties have filed letters granting blanket consent to the filing of amici curiae briefs.
1

2
and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School
Bernard S. Black, Nicholas D. Chabraja Professor,
Northwestern University Law School and Kellogg
School of Management
John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
and Director of the Center on Corporate Governance,
Columbia Law School
James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law,
Duke University School of Law
Mira Ganor, Judge Solomon Casseb, Jr. Research
Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law
Ronald J. Gilson, Marc and Eva Stern Professor of
Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business,
Emeritus, Stanford Law School
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Richard Paul Richman Professor of Law and Co-Director, Richman Center for Business, Law & Public Policy, Columbia Law School
Lawrence Hamermesh, Emeritus Professor, Widener University Delaware Law School, and Executive
Director, University of Pennsylvania Institute for
Law and Economics
Henry B. Hansmann, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law, Yale Law School
Marcel Kahan, George T. Lowy Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, William W. Cook Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School
Michael Klausner, Nancy and Charles Munger

3
Professor of Business and Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School
Reinier H. Kraakman, Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Brian JM Quinn, Associate Dean for Experiential
Learning and Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School
Edward B. Rock, Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Corporate Governance & Finance, New
York University School of Law
Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School
Helen S. Scott, Professor of Law and Co-Director of
the Leadership Program on Law and Business, New
York University School of Law
Holger Spamann, Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School
Randall S. Thomas, John S. Beasley II Professor of
Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School

4
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Most individual shareholders cannot obtain full
information about a corporation’s speech or political
activities, even after the fact, nor can most shareholders prevent their savings from being used for political
activity with which they disagree. These often-misunderstood points of corporate law are relevant to this
case in two ways.
First, this Court has often looked to the rights of
corporate shareholders in determining the rights of
union members and non-members to control the union’s use of their funds for political spending, and vice
versa.2 In doing so, the Court has sometimes assumed
that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political
expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending.3 As explained in
this brief, that assumption is mistaken.
2 E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
343-44 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93,
325 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring & dissenting), overruled in
part by 558 U.S. 310; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 709-10 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting),
overruled by 558 U.S. 310; Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 247 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978); Pipefitters Local Union
No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401-02, 406-08 (1972);
United States v. Int’l Union UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957).

E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370; McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 275 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Austin, 494 U.S. at 70910 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 555 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34; see also Int’l Assoc.
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 678
F.2d 1092, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
3

5
Union non-members are currently protected from
being forced to fund union political expression or activity by opt-out rights under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and plaintiff in this case
seeks the more expansive right to refuse to fund any
union activity whatsoever. In contrast, individual
shareholders currently have no “opt out” rights or
practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting any of their savings into equity investments, as
doing so would impose damaging economic penalties
and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors. If the Court decides to give union
non-members additional rights to refuse to contribute
to union speech, the Court should not act on the erroneous belief that this will accord union non-members
the same rights enjoyed by individual investors.
Second, most Americans must routinely fund
speech with which they disagree. While some of this
compulsion is from practical reality rather than law—
individuals could in theory refuse to invest in any
stocks or equity if they are willing to bear the potentially massive economic penalties that come from
leaving their savings in cash and bonds—there are
numerous examples outside the union context of laws
that require individuals to fund expressive activities.
This Court has dealt with public universities that require students to pay activities fees that fund groups
those students may disagree with, Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
221 (2000), and state bars that use funds for regulating the legal profession, Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990). Other examples abound,

6
but most relevant here are the laws enacted by a number of states requiring public employees to contribute
to defined contribution plans to fund their retirement.4 Michigan, for instance, requires many public
employees to contribute at least 2% of their pay to a
retirement plan, while Oklahoma requires at least
4.5%.5 Not only do many of these plans require participants to pay fees to third-party administrators—
entities that may use these funds for lobbying or other
political activity—but as explained in this brief investment in virtually any retirement plan option requires subsidizing blatant political speech that the individual can neither affect nor prevent. There is,
simply put, very little way for most individuals in
modern America to avoid subsidizing speech with
which they disagree.
Part I of this brief shows that corporate law does
not afford shareholders any right to “opt out” or otherwise control the use of capital they have invested in
a corporation. Part II explains that most corporate
shareholders have no ability to use voting rights or
sell their shares to prevent their invested capital from
being used in ways with which they disagree. Part III
Alicia H. Munnell et al., Defined Contribution Plans in the
Public Sector: An Update, 37 STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS,
April 2014, at 1, 2-4, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/SLP_37_508rev.pdf.
4

Id. at 3; Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System,
The New Defined Contribution System: Understanding the Basics, http://www.opers.ok.gov/dc-basics (last visited Dec. 1,
2017). Ohio requires state teachers to contribute 14% of their
pay to a defined contribution plan. STRS Ohio, DC Plan, https://
www.strsoh.org/aboutus/impact/dc.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2017).
5
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describes how investment structures, tax policy, and
conventional financial advice all drive individuals to
invest in ways that reinforce their inability to obtain
information about or control corporate political
spending.
ARGUMENT
I.

Individual Shareholders Generally Have
No Right to “Opt Out” or Otherwise
Control the Use of Capital They Invest in
a Corporation.
What can a shareholder do if she disagrees with a
corporate expenditure, whether on a particular business strategy or in support of a political position? The
short answer is very little. Shareholders do not typically have any right to control or direct the use of capital they have invested in a corporation, whether publicly or privately owned.
Authority over corporate funds resides in a board
of directors and officers to whom the board delegates
authority.6 Shareholders of U.S. corporations have no
authority to instruct or control boards, officers, employees, or corporate agents in how they act for a cor-

6 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 105 (Little,
Brown & Co., 1986) (“directors . . . have the formal legal power
to manage the corporation”); Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 141(a)
(West 2017). Delaware has been the leading corporate jurisdiction for decades, and this section is based primarily on Delaware
law, but fairly summarizes the law in other states as well.

8
poration, or to directly manage or act for a corporation.7 Instead, a “stockholder owns an interest in a
share of stock, a financial investment granting no direct control over the properties, equipment, contract
rights, organizational structure, and other elements
that make up the corporation itself.”8
Indeed, a core goal of corporate law is to give directors and officers legal authority to act in ways with
which shareholders may profoundly disagree. Directors, officers, employees, and corporate agents are not
agents of shareholders, and owe shareholders no duty
of obedience.9 This “separation of ownership and control” is often identified as a fundamental or essential
attribute of the corporate form. 10 “A review of elementary corporate law shows that [the] power of [a]
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
232 (Del. 2008) (“it is well-established that stockholders of a corporation . . . may not directly manage the business and affairs of
the corporation”). In Europe, shareholders do have rights to instruct directors. REINIER KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 73 (Oxford 2d ed. 2009).
7

8 Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 193 (1991). For recent cases illustrating
this point, see, e.g., Gorman v. Salamone, 2015 WL 4719681, *5
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2015); CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.

Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55-57
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., Harvard Business
School Press 1985).
9

10 E.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 8-9 (Foundation Press, 2002); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET
AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 79 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2012).
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principal to direct the activities of [an] agent does not
apply to the stockholders against the directors or officers of their corporation.”11
Directors and officers are fiduciaries for the corporation as a whole, and face judicial scrutiny in shareholder-initiated lawsuits over whether they have
acted with care or engaged in self-dealing. 12 However, their duties do not compel directors to use corporate funds to speak, or avoid speaking, in political
controversies as they believe shareholders would prefer, because the most basic of corporate law doctrines—the “business judgment rule”—precludes judicial review of board decisions, absent evidence of a
conflict of interest or a complete failure to exercise
any care.13

11

Clark, supra note 9, at 56.

12

F.D.I.C. v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 130 (5th Cir. 1992).

Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976), aff’g 338 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). The fact that
corporate speech furthers a director’s political views or goals
would not typically give rise to a “conflict of interest” for corporate law purposes. Heightened judicial scrutiny generally requires a showing of financial “self-dealing” where a fiduciary
“stands on both sides” of a transfer of assets to or from the corporation. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21-23 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(“in the absence of self-dealing, it is not enough to establish the
interest of a director by alleging that he received any benefit not
equally shared by the stockholders”); Sullivan v. Hammer, 1990
WL 114223, *5-*6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), aff’d 594 A.2d 48 (Del.
1991) (corporate “gifts” merely required to be “within the range
of reasonableness,” and board decision can be overturned on selfdealing grounds “only if a plaintiff can show that a majority of
the directors expected to derive personal financial benefit from
the transaction”); see also Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,
13
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Expenditures by corporations on politics do not
typically generate heightened scrutiny, and shareholders cannot use derivative lawsuits to override decisions about such expenditures by boards.14 These
facts about corporate law hold true even if (in an unrealistic hypothetical) shareholders were uniform in
their political views, and uniformly opposed an expenditure approved by the corporate board. These
facts are unquestionably true in a more typical situation where shareholders disagree among themselves
about politics. Nor do shareholders have indirect
257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971); Case v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 204
N.E.2d 643, 646-47 (N.Y. 1965); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d
776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
14 Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 257-58
(1981). The application of the deferential business judgment
rule to political expenditures is so clear that few cases have even
been pursued to a reported decision. A rare example, in which
the court held the business judgment rule was a valid defense to
an attack on a corporate contribution to a political action committee, is Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000). An exception that proves the rule is when political
activity violates a statute, such as the statutory ban on corporate
donations to a political party. A legal violation removes judicial
deference under the business judgment rule. Miller v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. Barnes v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 92-93 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (claim by policyholder of mutual insurance company
seeking to stop insurer from engaging in political activities dismissed because decision was protected by business judgment
rule and policyholder had no constitutional right to prevent insurer’s use of premium revenues to support activities with which
premium holder disagreed, nor to compel dividend to policyholders).
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means to accomplish this goal—such as selling shares
or using votes—as explained next.
II.

Most Individual Shareholders Cannot Indirectly Influence the Use of Their Invested Capital for Political Expression.
The basic corporate law set out in Part I is sometimes viewed as incomplete because, it is asserted,
shareholders have indirect methods of achieving what
corporate law bars them from achieving through direct control. Shareholders, it is asserted or assumed,
can “opt out” by withdrawing their funds if they do
not approve of how directors are using their invested
capital.15 Alternatively, they can use their power to
vote to elect directors who will act as shareholders
want.16
These assumptions are wrong for most shareholders. Controlling shareholders17 may be able to control
directors, but most shareholders beneficially own
stock as minority investors in corporations with dispersed ownership. Most investors have little influence, direct or indirect, on a typical corporate board.
As stated by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, “the practical realities of stock market
ownership have changed in ways that deprive most
15 E.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (a “shareholder invests
in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his
investment at any time and for any reason.”).

E.g., id. at 794-95 (emphasizing shareholders’ “power to
elect the board of directors” as a way “to protect their own interests.”).
16

17 “Controlling shareholder” means a shareholder with sufficient shares to determine the outcome of director elections.
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stockholders of both their right to voice and their right
of exit.”18 Both the right to sell and the right to vote
are typically useless for shareholders as a means of
controlling or influencing specific corporate actions,
including the use of corporate funds for political purposes.
A.

Shareholders do not typically have
the right to compel a corporation
to repurchase or find a buyer for
their shares.
Shareholders may not withdraw any of the funds
they have invested in a corporation except insofar as
a majority of the board approves a dividend or stock
repurchase.19 Shareholders who wish to sell shares
can only do so by finding third party buyers on their
own. But finding a buyer is typically difficult if not
impossible at the majority of corporations, as discussed next.
B.

Shares of most corporations are
not traded on public markets, and
finding buyers for such shares is
difficult or impossible.
More than six million corporations file U.S. income
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law
Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370
(2015).
18

19 See Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 151(b) (West 2017) (every Delaware corporation must have at least one class of non-redeemable common stock); Blaustein v. Lord Baltmore Capital Corp., 84
A.3d 954, 958-59 (Del. 2014); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
1379-80 (Del. 1993).
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tax returns. 20 Only about 4,000 corporations are
listed on a U.S. stock exchange—less than 0.1% of corporations that filed tax returns.21 Of the rest, some
are owned by a single shareholder, but many are beneficially owned by dispersed minority owners. Most
publicly traded companies are bigger, on average,
than companies that lack active public markets for
their shares. But many companies without public
markets are still large and have substantial numbers
of shareholders. Examples include Cargill, with revenues exceeding $130 billion and over 200 shareholders, and Mars, with revenues exceeding $33 billion
and over 45 shareholders.22 Large non-listed companies also include those controlled by private equity
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2016 STATISTICS OF INCOME,
2016 TAX STATISTICS 2 (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/16taxstatscard.pdf (including S corporations).
20

21 Listed Domestic Companies, Total, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO (last
visited Dec. 1, 2017). More corporations are registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
STUDY OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 21 (Sept.
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox404_study.pdf, but many do so because they have publicly traded
bonds and few shareholders, or lack significant amounts of trading volume. John C. Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effects of Ownership on M&A (June 2010), at 5, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1884157 (Table 1).

Andrea Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies
2014, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/
sites/andreamurphy/2014/11/05/americas-largest-private-companies-2014/; see also Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, Accounting Choices and Capital Allocation: Evidence from Large
Private U.S. Firms (Dec. 2016 working paper), at 16-18 & Table
22
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funds, which represent dispersed investors through a
variety of intermediaries.23 In total, the value of unlisted corporations represents one-third to one-half of
the value of all U.S. corporations.24
Listed shares trade in significant volume—thousands of shares per day. By contrast, shares of the
vast majority of corporations do not trade in public
markets at all. When they do trade, they do so only
erratically.25 Finding a buyer for shares that are not

3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373498 (analyzing data
on number of private firms and the ownership of those private
firms); Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes
and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations,
45 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 181, 181 (2008) (hundreds of corporations
are no longer registered with the SEC but continue to have numerous shareholders).
Private equity funds invested $644 billion in U.S.-based
companies in 2016. Private Equity: Top States & Districts,
AMERICAN INVESTMENT COUNCIL, http://www.investmentcouncil.org/private-equity-at-work/education/private-equity-topstates-districts/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
23

24 John C. Coates IV, Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 79, 89 (Jennifer G. Hill &
Randall S. Thomas eds., Edward Elgar 2015) (Table 4.1). SEC
rules require registration by companies with more than 500 unaccredited record shareholders (or more than 2000 accredited investors) and $10 million or more in assets. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78l,
78m, 78o(d) (West 2017). Public company shareholders are also
unable to use sales or votes to influence political spending, for
reasons discussed below.

Leuz et al., supra note 22, at 184, 204-05 (reporting on private companies with stocks that are traded but only at low levels, with trading not occurring on many days). Private equity
25
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traded on public markets is difficult, and sometimes
impossible, at least at any reasonable price.
Shares of unlisted corporations trade at heavily
discounted prices relative to their intrinsic value because of their lack of liquidity. 26 One study found
that, controlling for observable differences unrelated
to liquidity, stocks increased in price by 25% when
first listed on the New York Stock Exchange.27 Similarly, a study showed that prices for companies without publicly traded stock can be 30% lower than for
comparable publicly held companies.28 A minority equity position does not have ability to control the decisions of the company, resulting in a further decrease
in value known as a “minority discount.” 29 Even if
shareholders are willing to accept such discounts,
funds do not trade stocks, except as part of a sale of an entire
corporation, as chosen by fund advisors, not fund investors.
26 Reasons for this include: Few buyers have information
about such companies or sellers. Few sellers have information
about potential buyers, or even who they may be. Few dealers
hold such shares in inventory, and few brokers are available to
look for buyers. Few if any research analysts cover such companies. Transaction costs will be significant relative to the sale.
Such shares are held longer, tax bases are lower, and sales trigger higher taxes. Fraud risk is higher, as such companies are
not subject to disclosure laws or SEC enforcement.

Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange
Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 1, 14, 16 (1986).
27

John Koeplin et al., The Private Company Discount, 12 J.
APPL. CORP. FIN. 94, 95 (2000).
28

John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of
Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262-63 (1999).
29
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sales of stock of private companies take significant
time and trigger taxes, reducing the attractiveness of
“exit” in response to corporate actions the shareholder
disfavors.
In sum, the majority of individual owners of shares
of the majority of corporations would incur significant
economic costs to sell their shares.
C.

Stock sales cannot generally be
used to prevent, deter, or influence
the political activities of publicly
traded companies.
Even for shareholders of publicly listed companies,
the ability to sell is generally not an effective remedy
for undesirable corporate political expenditures. Disclosure laws are currently such that shareholders do
not receive information that would enable sales in advance of, or even in response to, political expenditures. From the perspective of the shareholder, a sale
in response to an unwanted political expenditure
would come too late, would be at a price where the
expenditure was already “priced in,” and would entail
relatively large costs (including taxes). As such, individual share sales would at best be the equivalent of
closing the barn door after a horse has been stolen,
the stock being sold at a price that already reflects the
conduct to which the shareholder objected.
Federal law does not require corporations to provide shareholders with advance notice of political expenditures.30 In fact, most public companies do not
disclose anything about political expenditures, even
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89 (2010).
30

17
after the fact, except for contributions to connected
political action committees that are required to be disclosed under lobbying disclosure laws. Efforts to petition the SEC to adopt disclosure requirements for
public companies31 have to date been unavailing, and
lobbying regulations are underenforced and far from
comprehensive.32 While an increasing number of the
very largest companies have voluntarily adopted disclosure policies, few make comprehensive disclosures—they do not, for example, report their contributions to trade groups that lobby on their behalf.33
Almost none makes these disclosures in advance.34
A prominent set of undisclosed corporate expenditures are dues and other contributions to trade groups
or organizations organized under Internal Revenue

See COMMITTEE ON DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE POLITICAL
SPENDING, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING (Aug. 3, 2011), available
at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.
31

32 Charles Fried et al., Lobbying Law in the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed Improvements, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 43436, 462-63 (2011).

See ZICKLIN CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS RESEARCH AT
WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE
2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 14-15 (Center for Political Accountability
2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/out9bfj. Shareholders can
seek information about political spending based on their rights
to inspect corporate “books and records,” e.g., Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 220, but to be effective such requests typically require
threatened or actual litigation and resources beyond those available to most shareholders.
33

THE

34

ZICKLIN, supra note 33, at 14-15.
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Code subsections 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6).35 Those organizations can spend up to half of their revenues on
politics without being treated as “political” by the Internal Revenue Service and without disclosing specific donors, and they may be able to spend more, to
the extent tax law is underenforced. Occasional leaks
or accidental disclosures reveal that many public corporations give substantial sums to these organizations. 36 Outside such accidental disclosures, shareholders ordinarily never learn about these expenditures even after the fact, much less in advance.
Shareholders thus have no means to respond to
corporate political spending to which they object.
Shareholders often never find out their money is being used to fund political expression or activity to
which they would object, and even when they do find
out, any sale of shares will be too late to allow them
to “opt out” of that spending. By the time the sale
occurs, the political speech has already been made in
the name of the corporation with the shareholders’
money. Without comprehensive disclosure, even the
deterrent effect of after-the-fact sales has little force.
In addition, given that “market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
For data on spending by such organizations, see Bebchuk
& Jackson, supra note 30, at 94.
35

36 E.g., Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Error Reveals Donors and
the Price of Access, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2014, at A15, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/republicans-corporate-donors-governors.html?_r=0 (article detailing inadvertent
disclosures of members of 501(c)(4), including Coca-Cola, Exxon
Mobil, Pfizer, and Walmart, each of which contributed at least
$250,000).
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statements about companies, thereby affecting stock
market prices,” 37 any expenditure will have already
had whatever effect on share value it is likely to have
by the time a shareholder learns about it, and any
sale by the shareholder will be at a price reflecting
that effect. Sales of shares would also generate transaction costs and trigger taxes. As a result, they would
only occur if a shareholder were willing to incur material economic losses to protest the use of the shareholder’s invested capital.
From the perspective of a corporate board, if
shareholders sold shares en masse to protest the same
political expenditure, and buyers of the stock shared
the same negative view of the expenditure, the company’s stock price could fall, increasing its cost of capital. However, shareholders have no way to coordinate among themselves in choosing whether or when
to sell. They are also unlikely to respond uniformly
or rapidly to the limited information available about
political expenditures, in part because they (and potential buyers of the stock) disagree about politics and
the importance of any given expenditure.
Even if shareholders could overcome their collective action problem, even if they had uniform views
about politics, and even if potential buyers of their
stock shared their views, companies raise relatively
little capital from equity investors after their initial

37 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct.
2398, 2403 (2014) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
248, n.28 (1988)).
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public offerings.38 They instead rely on earnings and
external debt to fund growth. 39 The prospect of
slightly higher equity capital costs due to sales by
shareholders would not deter most corporations from
political activity.
In sum, shareholders cannot control or deter political expenditures by selling their stock, or threatening
to do so, even at public companies. This is true even
though many individual shareholders may in fact disapprove of corporate political speech. The majority of
the beneficial owners of public companies have no
practical way to withdraw their capital to prevent or
control corporate political expenditures.
D.

Shareholder voting rights are not
generally useful for directing or
influencing specific corporate
actions.
The right to vote is no more useful than the right
to sell for shareholders who wish to control corporate
political expenditures. The reason is simple: Most
shareholders—and the majority of individual shareholders in public corporations—are not controlling
shareholders.40 That is, they do not have sufficient
JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE
524-25 (Pearson, 3d ed. 2014).
38

39

Id.

See note 15 above. A listed company will have in excess of
500 shareholders on the company’s stock ledger (“record” shareholders), and in fact public companies have on average more
than 12,000 record shareholders. Coates, supra note 21, at 5
(Table 1). Some companies, such as Procter & Gamble, have
more than 2,000,000 shareholders. Id. at 5. By definition, only
40
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voting rights to control their companies, nor do they
have the capacity to acquire control of the companies
in which they invest. Their voting rights give them
no practical ability to influence management generally, much less to control or opt out of specific political
expenditures.
The majority of corporations with dispersed ownership have one of two types of ownership structures,
neither of which creates practical opportunities for
voting rights to influence board decisions. At many
corporations, one person or small group has a control
“block” with effective ability to control the election of
one shareholder can be a “majority shareholder” for any company. Even if several shareholders together control the company, the number of shareholders in the control group will usually be no more than a few.
An average public company thus has 12,000 minority shareholders and only one majority shareholder or a few control shareholders. Even this understates the ratio of minority to control
shareholders, because (as discussed in Part III) two-thirds of record shareholders are institutions, which invest on behalf of thousands (or in aggregate, millions) of others. Marshall E. Blume &
Donald B. Keim, The Changing Nature of Institutional Stock Investing (Nov. 12, 2014 working paper), at 2-3, available at http://
tinyurl.com/qhqskrp; Coates, supra note 24, at 81. More than 95
million individuals own shares through 3,200 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, for example. Kimberly Burham et al., Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the
Internet, 2013, ICI RES. PERSP., Oct. 2013, at 1, available at
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per19-09.pdf; BRIAN REID ET AL., 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 177 (Investment Company Institute, 5th ed. 2015) available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
2015_factbook.pdf (Table 5). Thus, the true ratio of minority to
control shareholders is vastly higher than 12,000 to 2 or 3 that
the record shareholder data suggest.
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directors, which renders the nominal voting rights of
minority investors incapable of changing the composition of the board. 41 Examples include Walmart,
Ford, Google, and Facebook. A recent study found
that 96% of a representative sample of U.S. companies listed on a stock exchange have a voting block
with 40% of the stock on average, and in many the
block controls a majority of shares.42 Since directors
are elected based on a plurality or majority of shares
voted, an effort by a minority shareholder seeking to
displace a director at these companies is either wholly
futile (where a majority block will determine the outcome), or would require convincing more than 95% of
non-affiliated shareholders, a burden that is insurmountable in practice.
In the second category, most public companies
that lack majority or near-majority blockholders are
large and have such dispersed ownership that few if
any shareholders are capable of overcoming the costs
of coordinating other shareholders to mount an effective election contest. 43 To elect directors at public
companies, shareholders must solicit “proxies,” which
requires significant legal and communication costs.
Incumbent directors, by contrast, can rely on corporate funds to pay their costs of fighting the contest. A

41 Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in
the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378-80 (2009).
42

Id. at 1382.

43

KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 29, 62.
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proxy contest typically lasts months44 and is “extraordinarily expensive” for shareholders,45 who commonly
incur more than ten million dollars in expenses46 and
are still outspent by incumbents.47 Even when pursued by well-resourced activist hedge funds, proxy
contests are often unsuccessful.48 To give their proxy
fights a boost, hedge funds build blocks of stock that
are substantially larger than most individuals own or
could afford—yet even hedge funds generally avoid
full-blown proxy contests. 49 While activist hedge
funds have been increasing in influence and activity
levels over time, their resources well exceed those of
most individuals. Institutions that invest on behalf of
44 Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism:
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON.
610, 621 (2013) (Table 4).

Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d
335, 341 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citing RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EISHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 (3d ed. 2001 supp.)).
45

46

Gantchev, supra note 44, at 610.

Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Considerations in Proxy Contests: The Primary Means of Effecting Fundamental Corporate Change in the 1990s, 13 Geo. Mason U. L.
Rev. 745, 776 (1991).
47

48

Gantchev, supra note 44, at 620.

Id. at 618 (Gantchev assembles a comprehensive data set
of proxy contests between 2000 and 2007 and identifies only 74
that qualify—less than 0.1% of all elections of corporate directors
over that period). A more recent study finds a modest increase
in 2008 and 2009, but then a fall-off in 2010, and in all years
proxy contests occur in only a tiny fraction of board elections.
Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. FIN.
ECON. 316, 339 (2014) (Fig A1).
49
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most individuals—such as mutual funds and pension
funds—rarely wage proxy contests.
In sum, whether because of insider blocks, or because of the collective action costs of proxy contests,
most shareholders of U.S. public companies do not
have meaningful ability to use their votes to influence
boards of directors about anything, much less specific
political expenditures.
III.

Many Individuals Are Effectively
Compelled to Maintain Investments in
Companies Whose Political Expenditures
They Do Not Know and Cannot Control.
The bottom line of Part II is that the majority of
individual shareholders cannot use their rights to sell
or vote to avoid subsidizing corporate political speech
or activity with which they disagree. Reinforcing
these limits are three trends in the ownership of U.S.
corporations over the last thirty years. These trends
are towards (1) more institutional ownership,
(2) more “layers” of institutions between individual
owners and corporations, and (3) a general weakening
of the ability of individuals to take action—whether
through sales, votes, lawsuits, or otherwise—to respond to corporate activities.
A partial cause of these trends is the now-standard
financial advice for individuals to invest in diversified, low-cost, broad-based baskets of stocks and to
“buy and hold” for the long term. Standard employersponsored retirement savings plans—a channel
through which an increasing share of investment
flows—make it difficult or impossible for individuals
to do otherwise. Institutional intermediaries are not
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generally required to pass along to individual investors information they may receive as record (i.e., formal) shareholders about specific decisions by corporations they own. Together, these forces effectively
cause an increasing number of individuals to maintain investments in corporations, even if the individuals disagree with political speech by corporations using their investment capital.
A.

Most beneficial owners of public
corporations are individuals who
own through institutions such as
mutual funds and pension funds.
Since the mid-20th century, institutions—pension
funds, insurance companies, bank trusts, mutual
funds, and other intermediaries—have held increasing amounts of stock issued by American corporations. Figure 1 reflects the Federal Reserve’s “Flow of
Funds” data, a standard source of information about
this trend.50 The Fed’s data make clear the general
magnitude and persistence of the trend toward institutional ownership.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS,
BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS
118 (2017), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
z1/current/z1.pdf (Table L.223). These data are not comprehensive, and understate institutional ownership because they count
private equity funds, non-profits, and hedge funds in the “household” sector. Coates, supra note 24, at 89.
50
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Figure 1: Institutional Ownership
of U.S. Corporate Equity

Households

Institutions

Rest of World

The increase in institutional ownership began as
early as the 1950s, and has continued steadily ever
since. While ownership by the types of “institutions”
the Fed tracks leveled off after 2000, other institutions, such as hedge funds and private equity funds,
have continued to increase their ownership. The result is that less than one-third of total equity in U.S.
companies is now held directly by individuals.
The number of institutional layers between any
given corporation and the individuals who indirectly
own its stock (the “beneficial owners”) has also grown.
Institutions own about 10% of stock held by equity
mutual funds, and a larger share of other mutual
funds—an increasing trend of individuals owning
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shares of institutions, which in turn invest in other
institutions, which in turn own corporate stock.51
Mutual funds are a good example. Corporate law
only allows formal “record” owners that have held
shares continuously or on a certain date to exercise
shareholder rights. 52 Mutual fund shares are commonly owned in “omnibus accounts” in which a broker
pools shares on behalf of multiple clients in “sub-accounts,” commonly including pension funds or insurers, some of which invest on behalf of multiple beneficiaries.53 This pooling and commingling means that
individuals who invest their savings in mutual
funds—or who were forced to put their workplace retirement savings into mutual funds—are not the formal owners of “record” of any of the companies their
savings are supporting.

51 REID ET AL., supra note 40, at 217 (funds of funds), 234 (institutional investors other than funds of funds) (Tables 45, 62).

In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, *3 (Del. Ch.
July 13, 2015) (granting motion for summary judgment, holding
institutional investors did not have appraisal rights because administrative transfers among the layers of ownership violated
what the court acknowledged was a technical and antiquated
system focusing on continuous formal record ownership).
52

53 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NATIONAL EXAM RISK
ALERT 1, 4 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/ocie/riskalert-mastersubaccounts.pdf.
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B.

Individuals who own stock through
intermediaries do not have the
right to direct the sale or votes of
their shares.
Most corporate stock held by institutions are held
by separate legal entities, such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, and
private equity funds. Such entities do not pass
through to their own beneficial owners either the
rights to vote or sell the shares of the stock they purchase. Pension fund beneficiaries, for example, have
no ability to influence the companies in which the
funds are invested.54 Insureds have no ability to control how insurance companies invest the premiums
they pay. Investors in mutual funds or exchangetraded funds do have the ability to select funds based
on stated investment policies, just as annuitants generally have the ability to set basic investment parameters for how their funds are invested; once their
funds are invested, however, the annuitants and fund
investors have no ability to force the divestment of a
particular corporate stock, and may only divest from
the fund as a whole. Even the professional managers
of the increasingly important category of index funds
cannot sell a given company’s stock, because they
have precommitted to hold an entire index.
Individuals who own any of these types of institutional investments cannot exercise voting rights associated with the shares. Instead, those rights are exercised by the management of the institutions. Individuals that invest through institutions face collective
Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133,
167 (1998).
54
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action problems that are just as large as (if not larger
than) those facing individuals who directly invest in
corporations. The result is that most individuals, who
now primarily invest through separate entity intermediaries, cannot even exercise the limited powers
analyzed in Part II.
To make these points concrete, consider an individual who buys the stock of a large broad-based stock
fund, such as Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund. That
individual’s savings are invested in the stocks of companies listed on the S&P index. Currently, that fund
owns shares of Apple, Inc. If, hypothetically, Apple’s
board or its government affairs officer were to spend
money on political speech disfavored by the individual, the individual has no power to compel Vanguard
to sell Apple stock in response. Nor can the individual
compel Vanguard to vote against Apple’s current directors. All the individual can do is to sell the Vanguard fund shares. But if the individual wants to invest in a broad-based large-cap fund of any kind,
which would be advisable for reasons discussed next,
that individual would only be selling Vanguard
shares to buy another fund’s shares, which in turn
would be likely to own Apple stock. In short, unless
an individual decides to ignore standard financial advice about how to invest, there is no way to avoid an
investment in Apple, however disagreeable its political activities may be.
C.

Individual investors have little
prudent choice other than
investing through institutions to
achieve diversification.
Part of the reason for the growth in institutional
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investors is that finance theory and conventional financial advice long ago identified the fact that most
individuals are not well situated to select specific
stocks from thousands of equity investments. 55
Standard financial theory also has long identified diversification as an important tool for investors to
achieve the best risk-adjusted returns.56
Diversification entails identifying and maintaining a substantial number of investments, not just one
or a few, and monitoring the companies selected over
time. For example, when two companies merge, when
one company goes bankrupt, or when a company divests a major business, investors must “rebalance”
their portfolios to maintain a desired degree of diversification and risk. Dividends must be reinvested,
brokers retained, tax records kept, and filings made.
Maintaining a diversified portfolio requires effort, expertise, and time.
Professional asset management has also increasingly been most cost-effective for individual investors
through passive, indexed investment strategies. 57
55 For an empirical study documenting the disadvantages individual direct investors face, see Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN.
773 (2000).

Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79
(1952).
56

57 Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549, 571 (1995); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 596 (Aspen Publishers, 8th
ed. 2011).
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Such strategies involve buying and holding broadbased index funds or financial products that mimic
such funds, which can achieve hard-to-beat returns at
low cost over sustained periods of time. Most nominally “active” mutual funds rely to a large extent on
passive investment in baskets of stock, and simply
“overweight” or “underweight” portions of the relevant market benchmark.58 Pension funds, too, outsource portfolio management to advisers that invest
in large numbers of public companies, rather than a
select few.
A further force leading individuals to invest
through institutions is the growing use of defined contribution (DC) retirement plans such as 401(k) and
403(b) plans.59 As noted above, some states require
public employees to invest in DC plans,60 and in the
private sector those plans may be effectively compelled as well. Investment through DC plans enjoys
strong tax benefits61—or, equivalently, investors pay
58 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is
Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3330 (2009).

“Defined contribution” plans do not promise specific benefits, but instead allocate specific amounts as elected by an employee from their wages (sometimes matched by the employer)
into an investment account to be held for the employee’s benefit,
typically until retirement. In contrast, more conventional pension plans are called “defined benefit” plans because they promise beneficiaries a specific set of benefits in retirement, and the
risk of investment shortfalls is borne by the plan sponsor.
59

60

See supra pp. 5-6 & nn. 4-5.

Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement61
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economic penalties to invest outside a plan. As a result, “[v]irtually all saving by the working-age population currently takes place within employer-sponsored pension plans.” 62 An annual survey of employer-sponsored plans found that 78% of eligible employees participate, and fully diversified plan options
are the default and most common investment choice.63
Less than 10% of DC plans gave employees the option
to directly manage their investments in individual
stocks, and even those impose additional fees on investors.64
While employees are given choices within DC
plans, these plans are designed by employers with little input from typical employees. Most plans impose
significant limits on the flexibility of employee-investors to choose from the universe of potential investments, and commonly direct investments into the
kind of diversified index or other broad-based funds
that standard finance theory and advice recommends

Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Savings-Contributions-Savers-Credit (last updated Oct. 26, 2017) (“The amount
of the [tax] credit is 50%, 20% or 10% of your retirement plan or
IRA contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married filing jointly),
depending on your adjusted gross income . . . .”).
62 Alicia H. Munnell et al., What’s the Tax Advantage of
401(k)s?, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE, Feb. 2012, at 6, available at http://tinyurl.com/ndjkdwh.

AON HEWITT, 2014 UNIVERSE BENCHMARKS HIGHLIGHTS 1,
4 (2014), available at http://tinyurl.com/n964gmq.
63

64 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification, 124
YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 & n.28, 1539 (2015).
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for individuals.65 An individual might get to select between an international index fund and an S&P 500
fund, but would rarely get to select between investing
in Apple and Walmart.
“The most common type of investment options in
401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment
vehicles that pool funds managed by a professional
fund manager.”66 Early withdrawals from these accounts are tax penalized 67 and discouraged by plan
design.68 Similar tax subsidies and restrictions apply
to 529 plans, which have been increasingly used by

Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law
Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens
United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 539 (2010); see also Anne
Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 181-82 (2013);
BRIGHTSCOPE & INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE
BRIGHTSCOPE / ICI DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PROFILE: A
CLOSE LOOK AT 401(K) PLANS 7, 15-17, 25 (2014), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_14_dcplan_profile_401k.pdf
(documenting number of investment options, portion in types of asset
classes, growth in indexed equity funds within DC plans, and
that about 80% of plan assets are invested in diversified institutions).
65

66 Ayres & Curtis, supra note 64, at 1485, citing Sarah
Holden et al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances,
and Loan Activity in 2012, 19 ICI RES. PERSP. Dec. 2013 at 1, 21.
67

I.R.C. § 401(k) (West 2017).

68 Phil Edwards et al., Defined Contribution Plan Success
Factors, DCIIA, May 2015, at 4, available at https://tinyurl.com/
yd9vgfmt.
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individuals to save for college education for their children.69 To benefit from the tax subsidies fueling the
growth in DC plans, individuals must give up the
right to choose or influence the corporations in which
they invest.
As a result of these trends in financial management, it is difficult for most individual investors to
find any means of investing in corporate stock that
does not rely on both institutional intermediaries and
a broad-based, index or quasi-index strategy for investing. The bottom line is that most individuals now
invest in a large number of public companies, but do
so indirectly, and generally cannot pick and choose
stocks based on the recent or expected specific behavior of corporate issuers. This is true for public employees in many states, and private employees across
the nation.
D.

Institutional intermediaries are
not generally required to track or
disclose to their beneficiaries the
political activities of the companies
in which they invest.
Another effect of increased institutional ownership of corporate stock, and of increased “layers” of institutions, is to decrease further the amount of information that a typical individual shareholder can obtain about the political activities of the companies in
which the individual invests. As discussed above,
See An Introduction to 529 Plans, SECURITIES AND EXCOMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/intro
529.htm (last modified Jan. 6, 2014) (“participants in college savings plans have limited investment options and are not permitted to switch freely among available investment options.”).
69
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most corporations do not provide detailed information
about political expenditures. What limited information they do provide to shareholders is given to
shareholders of record, which are increasingly institutional investors.
Institutions, in turn, report the values of their investments, but they are not required to gather, analyze, and pass on information about the activities of
the companies in their portfolio. Institutions such as
mutual funds do not typically report to their investors
even basic financial information about companies in
which they invest, such as earnings, much less operational information such as political expenditures. Nor
do institutions typically devote any effort to monitor
political activities of the companies in which they invest. Thus, even if individuals wanted to pressure the
companies they indirectly own to alter political expenditures, they would lack even the most basic
rights to obtain information to know where to focus
their pressure.
E.

Most individual investors are in
practice compelled to maintain
investments in companies that can
engage in political expenditures
with which the investors disagree.
Together, the forces described in this Part III effectively compel an increasing number of individuals
to maintain investments in large numbers of corporations, even if the individuals disagree with political
expressions or activities taken by those corporations.
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Individuals of course can choose not to invest in
stock at all, or choose not to invest in stock through
retirement plans. But avoiding all equity investment
imposes a massive economic penalty over time.70 Using conventional figures for expected returns on diversified equity investments and contrasting them with
investments in Treasury bonds, Figure 2 depicts how
large the economic penalty of staying out of stocks altogether grows over the course of a typical investor’s
life.71
The results are dramatic. An investor in stocks
can expect to have more than eight times as much
money after 35 years as an investor making the same
investment in government bonds. There simply is no
economic “option” for ordinary individuals saving for
retirement to choose to avoid stocks altogether.

70 Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political
Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800,
838-40 (2012).

The figure uses data from Aswath Damodaran, Annual Returns on Stock, T.Bonds and T.Bills: 1928-Current, http://
pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/
histretSP.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2017). It assumes a fixed
one-time investment of $1,000 by an investor at age 30, and compounds returns annually on a diversified portfolio of equity investments using an expected rate of return composed of the
Treasury bond rate of 2.22% and an implied equity risk premium
of 6.28%, derived from trailing twelve-month cash yield on investments in the S&P 500. It compares the return on that investment with the return on investment on Treasury bonds over
the same period.
71
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Figure 2: The Cost of Opting Out of Stock

The same general point applies to the decision to
opt out of the tax advantages of broadly diversified
DC plans. Figure 3 depicts how large the economic
penalty of electing to invest directly in stocks and not
through tax-advantaged DC plans can be.72 While not
as severe as the cost of avoiding equity altogether, the
cost of trying to avoid the constraints of 401(k) plans

This figure uses conventional figures for expected equity
returns and averages after-tax returns for taxable and tax-deferred accounts over the past twenty-five years, based on data
and analysis from Munnell et al., supra note 62, at 5 (Table 4).
It assumes a 6% expected pre-tax return, divided into 2% dividends and 4% capital gains.
72
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by investing directly in taxable accounts is still a draconian penalty, roughly equal to a third of the expected return on a standard equity investment. And
this figure understates the penalty, because it excludes the “match” commonly given by employers for
investments through DC plans, and only compares
one investment at age 30, rather than a more realistic
stream of investments over time.
Figure 3: The Cost of Opting Out of
Tax-Advantaged 401(k)
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CONCLUSION
Amici urge careful consideration of the issues in
this case for the reasons stated above.
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